Air India 171 B787-800 crash 12.06.25

ahead of any initial report from the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau of India, I am attempting an educated look into the crystal ball.

DISCLAIMER: This is a private analysis without any guarantee for the accuracy of the reported facts and conclusions.

a) observation (high confidence) from available video footage:

  1. takeoff run after backtrack from VAAH (Ahmedabad) RWY 23. Visual impression that A/C got airborne rather late. Plume of dust indicating significant engine thrust at initial climb over the runway end.
  2. regular initial climb attitude.
  3. about 12 seconds after rotation, change in pitch attitude, climb terminated within few seconds, no apparent stall, controlled glide into terrain.
  4. RAT was deployed on final glide, no audible engine thrust noise, APU inlet open at crash site pictures.
  5. wing trailing flaps deployed at crash site pictures.
  6. a mayday call indicating thrust problems has been reported by authorities, though literal transcript has not yet been published.
  7. gear extended until impact, forwarded tilted gear trucks may indicate initiation of gear-up sequence
  8. sole survivor reported green/white (emergency) cabin lights and flickering.

b) apparent final state of A/C at crash:

  1. RAT (auto-)deploy, (auto-)initiation of APU startup, flickering lights / switch to emergency cabin lights: loss of electrical power fed from engine driven generators
  2. Control surfaces operational (RAT can assure minimum hydraulics + electric control) to maintain wings level and to control glide speed
  3. Insufficient/no thrust on both engines to maintain or gain altitude

c) discussion of possible faults and consequences:

hypothesis 1a/c misconfiguration for take-off“: erroneous settings of takeoff weight, ambient temperature/pressure, engine de-rating factor, flaps setting, possible miscalculation of V1, VR. Highly unlikely due to B788 automated crosschecking of weight on wheels, flaps settings. Would have triggered warning messages prior to T/O. After all, the A/C had a rather nominal takeoff run and initial climb with no observable “out of envelope” behavior. Hypothesis 1 is inconsistent with observed electrical system + dramatic thrust loss.

hypothesis 2unlawful interference, intentional action“: contradicted by a reported technical mayday call. Manually commanded dual-engine shutdown is a complex process and is unlikely performed after rotation in an efficient manner to affect both engines in an apparent simultaneous manner. Intentionally pulling back both thrust levers to flight idle would not be enough to trigger the electrical backup system, i.e. RAT deployment.

hypothesis 3: “a/c misconfiguration on initial climb“: initial climb would have normally seen “gear-up” action and in theory could have been confounded with “flaps up” action by pilot error, resulting in a loss of lift. This unlikely misconfiguration however could have been healed without catastrophic consequences by applying max thrust and manually keeping the A/C within the flight envelope. Hypothesis 3 is also inconsistent with observed electrical system + dramatic thrust loss.

now, leaving us with only scenarios which are able to trigger a rapid, simultaneous dual engine loss of thrust:

hypothesis 4: “fuel contamination / temperature“: A contamination of fuel (water, any sort of dirt) residual to the main tank (feeding the engines) from present or past refueling cannot be rules out, but it is highly unlikely that: i) this would lead to a perfectly synchronous and extremely quick and “efficient” flame-out of both engines without apparent visible clues (smoke, thrust bursts and altitude variations), ii) it has not been experienced (at least in parts noticed by crew or engine telemetry) by any other aircraft refueled from the same hypothetical contaminated airport(s). Although ambient temps in Ahmedabad were high (METAR: VAAH 120830Z 24003KT 6000 NSC 37/17 Q1000 NOSIG), I would also rather discount the possible issue of fuel vapor lock (elevated fuel temperature can result in the development of fuel vapor which cannot be processed by liquid fuel pumps) due to the large amount of fuel very likely drafted from the underground hydrant fuel system available at AMD or residual fuel from the prior flight and short rotation from DEL.

hypothesis 5: “systems commanded dual engine cutoff“: Both engines have their own EEC/FADEC (electronic engine control / full authority digital engine control) units with 2-fold redundancy and electricity generated by engine-mounted redundant generators. As long as the engine is turning, EECs are powered and are able to control fuel flow as commanded by cockpit-side thrust levers and fuel master switch sensors (with redundant sensors and wiring). On the fuel delivery side, each engine has it’s own mechanically coupled fuel pump which is able to directly draft fuel from the main tank – without support of main tank electrical boost pumps. Therefore, even with a total loss of power on all of the A/C electrical busses, each engine – once started – will autonomously continue to operate according to thrust-lever input, until fuel starvation. Now, B787 series got a unique further software package integrated into EEC called TCMA (Thrust Control Malfunction Accomodation System, https://patents.google.com/patent/US6704630B2/en). It actually does what the title is promising: Use a software logic to “correct” any physical misbehavior of an engine with regard to its commanded thrust level, more precisely: It is designed to radically shut down (closing of fuel master valve) a “runaway” engine if all of the following conditions are met: 1) the aircraft is on the ground, 2) thrust lever is at idle position, 3) engine is above idle rpm. TCMA has two independent channels (for each engine, each of the channels has authority to close the fuel valve) which each evaluate the 1-3 conditions. TCMA seems to be the only “authority” – apart from pilot action in the cockpit – to close the fuel valves and to simultaneously and rapidly shut down both engines. From the TCMA conditions, in the present scenario – takeoff thrust – only (3) was true at all times, (1) should have transitioned from true to false after leaving the ground while (2) is supposed to remain false at all times during takeoff.

Now, the real speculation starts: If the aircraft was faced with some additional, electrical issue (moisture, electric arc, power surge … these kind of things) at the very end of the takeoff run (past V1, such that the crew did not consider the option to abort – but possibly was distracted for an instant, explaining the slightly longer than expected ground run) or after rotation (in anticipation of, or at gear retraction) and that electrical interference and/or a software restart condition compromised the readout of the WOW (weight on wheels) and thrust lever sensors such that WOW remained at it’s ground state and thrust lever (both!) readouts were shortly flickering to an idle or null readout (and as such were accepted as valid input !) this could have closed both engine’s fuel valves shortly into the climb, leaving just some residual fuel for the initial positive rate.

I can’t resist my gut feeling, but the “capabilities” of TCMA remind me of MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) of the B737 MAX series (two fatal crashes: Lion-610, 29.10.18, Ethiopian-302, 10.03.19), where a “full authority” automated software system (which was introduced to control a secondary problem) detected an incorrect state from erroneous sensor input and executed an unexpected fatal action – unrelated to the problem it was designed for.

what is next ?

given sets of observations and their temporary sequence, make an educated prediction about the future. That’s not only a fun and useful thing in relationships with people, for business or as an investor, but I just came to a point where I think I had to do this for nothing less than one of the fundamental questions of humanity: are we alone, out there ?

Nope, I am not crazy, I am not a conspiracy theorist, I am not an esoteric, I just consider myself being a rational, down-to-earth analytical thinker.

This article reflects my personal opinion and does not constitute any form of advice for the public.

PHENOMENON: starting late November 2024, intensifying through December and eventually decreasing towards the Christmas holiday season, mirroring more isolated but repeated reports over the last 2-3 years, there have been numerous accounts of unexplained aerial (in some occasions even marine or trans-medium) “vehicles” or phenomenon in the US, specifically in – but not limited to – the coastal areas and installations exhibiting high levels of “activity concentrations” of human origin (power stations, airports, airbases, metro areas). Among many, two recent sources: [Reuters, AP]. In the media, things tend to be reported in a rather unspecific way that adds substantial noise to: what exactly had been observed and by whom ?

The “what exactly“: We have seen reports on objects ranging from: powered drones to lighter-than-air balloons to fixed wing or rotary aircraft to other objects (exhibiting none of the properties of the objects mentioned before) at locations ranging from: sea to land with open or protected airspace at those regions. For a suspected significant portion of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS, drones) operated by private or commercial operators in a low altitude band from ground level up to 400ft AGL, starting December 18 the FAA established temporary flight restrictions (TFR) [FAA] which have proven efficient to significantly reduce drone sightings at those low altitudes and locations. Projecting all sightings on a matrix (object type x object location) there are plenty of “benign” (identifiable) objects at “benign” (unprotected, lawful) locations, however a few of those other objects at benign locations and a few other objects at protected locations.

The “by whom“: This is ranging from amateur sightings to unofficial statements from people with current or past active involvement in civil aviation or in the military, to official statements of such professionals in public hearings (under oath) [US house of representatives hearings 2023, 2024], up to statements from federal agencies, such as the DoD or the FAA in an official (public) or classified setting. In the what x by whom space, let’s specifically zoom into the small corner of unidentified (other) phenomenon reported by aviation professionals or federal agencies. There we will find that there are indeed a few, multiple, consistent accounts of unexplained sightings reported from credible sources. To pick only two recent manifestations: [ATC, AARO classified briefing].

Zooming back out into the full picture of sighted aerial objects, it is helpful to understand how lawful vs. unlawful interference with air traffic is regulated. It is essentially a combination of properties or capabilities of the aircraft vs. properties of the airspace at a given location (range) and altitude (range). In brief, FAA dictates that only aircraft with certain properties (such as: aircraft class, altitude, speed, weight, identification lights, electronic id) can navigate certain parts of the US airspace at certain times. Some of those rules are rigid and exclusive, some of them following a request / clearance pattern involving aviation authorities, such as air traffic control (ATC). Again, to be specific, let’s zoom into the requirement for aircraft operating at night and in airspace used by (commercial) civil aviation. In order to operate you need proper aircraft visual and electronic (transponder) identification, i.e. you need those white/red flashing beacons and red/green positional lights and eventually an ATC clearance to enter certain airspaces (i.e. class A/B/C at higher altitudes or in the vicinity of major airports or mil areas). Further you need an active transponder with ADS-B out. That’s an electronic box in the cockpit (and an antenna mounted on the aircraft) that broadcasts your call-sign, speed, altitude (and depending on the aircraft class a couple more parameters) right on the radar screen of the ATC controller overlooking a certain portion of the airspace, having the responsible to issue clearance to enter and navigate parts of this airspace. The FAA transponder rules are simple and specifically exclude aircraft without transponder id operating above 10.000 ft or in the coastal areas, let alone (by other FAA rules) to fly around at night without FAA-compliant lighting.

But, that’s exactly what we observe in a few cases (no transponder, no standard lights, no clearance for the airspace) and without transparent consequences. In the majority of cases, though, aircraft with proper id can be tracked down to their operators and point of origin, some of them – usually by human error – violate FAA rules and are facing immediate investigation, if not criminal prosecution. In US airspace, under the intense surveillance from military and civil radar facilities, it is simply impossible to mess around with the system without being immediately addressed by ATC, escorted by military aviation and subsequently “handled” by law enforcement.

POLITICS: In a current climate of geopolitical tensions and rivalries between global powers, the protection of national assets and capabilities is given very high priority. Unfortunately – specifically on a military level – protection goes along with early detection and monitoring capabilities and the revelation of such strategic assets is somewhat connected to the revelation of what actually has been detected / protected – and what not. Therefore, we can expect some reluctance to the disclosure of findings relating to homeland security and defense.

Second, in government affairs in general and public security more specifically, it is not well regarded to talk about threats or problems without proposing solutions for which any consensus exists that is acceptable by the wider public. It’s a sign of weakness to ask questions without giving answers. If you are in politics or higher up in the administration, you better attempt to shut down discussion on issues for which you don’t have a plan or elegantly try to pass them on as someone other department’s issue.

Third, politics is entangled with economy: the industry, the capital market. Aerospace is a giant technology-heavy market embracing both the civil and the military sector, nationally and globally. We are seeing large corporations with high stakes as defense contractors and partners of civil aviation. We are equally seeing a growing base of civil providers of space technology partnering with the national (aeronautics and) space administration. Success in those markets is not related to marketing, but to hard “rocket-science”, technological capabilities. Yet, the industrial-political complex seems naively helpless to explain and amazingly passive to explore, analyze, perhaps even engineer some of the phenomena described in the first section. In the recent past, there have been bi-partisan attempts by a few lawmakers to promote legislation [congressional record, Senate 07 2023, see section 10 and others] that would require any private industry with access to material related to such unexplained technology to collaborate with the federal government. One of the sponsors of this initiative Sen. M. Rubio has now been appointed as future secretary of state to the upcoming Trump administration. If I were the CEO of such defense or aerospace contractor knowing what (intellectual) property may be buried deep in the secret corners of my company, I would frankly be much worried about my future legal situation, the fate of my IP and, of course, the fate of my shareholders. Hence, back to politics, this is not a cork that one wants just pop out of the bottle, fearing shock waves on the legal and financial side.

Bottom line on the political end: If there is anything that the public would need to know – irrespective if such matter poses a direct threat or not – one cannot expect this to happen without establishing (in a classified framework) a prior consensus between the political, legal and financial system, preferably on an international level. We should not be surprised such things take time, a lot of time !

PSYCHOLOGY:

For most people, the unknown is associated with fear. When faced with new issues that we have not yet learned how to deal with, we are more likely to expect a negative outcome than to have (self-)confidence in a positive outcome. In an anxious mood, we either look for trusted leaders to provide us with answers or comfort, or we seek to share our anxiety with a larger, like-minded group of people. Sadly, the pattern of “fear” is a popular tool – facilitated by modern media – to cement the bond between government leadership and the people, thus enabling them to trust and obey without reservations. Another possible way out of anxiety about a particular matter is to escape into other areas of our lives that keep us busy and reward us with some sort of routine stability, i.e. the daily pursuit of going to work and making ends meet. Both routes nicely complement each other, i.e. daily routine sets in quickly to stabilize trust and comfort offered from the outside.

At the level of information intake by individuals (through multiple sensory channels), we must be aware that the ability to perceive and process information is not evenly distributed in society, especially when it comes to intellectual and emotional capacities [such as HSP, SPS]. This also includes a gray area between thinking and feeling, which is determined by intuition or transcendent spiritual abilities. While it is common in “modern” Western societies (oriented towards an economy of material goods & services) to classify people by education or income, perhaps it is time to consider a change in thinking in the evaluation of perception, emotions and intuition, especially with regard to dealing with unexplained phenomena of supposedly non-human origin. However, when it comes to tackling a response to the “unknown” for a society at large, you better be prepared to develop a strategy that cautiously also includes those who may not be able to adequately (consciously, structured and peacefully) adopt the news. The “therapy” of choice against anxiety consists of an escalating sequence of dealing with the matter, with the individual escalation steps being interrupted by methods of relaxation.

Against this background, I find it plausible that the December 2024 “drone rush” – which is still partly unexplained but is accompanied by numerous official statements on public safety – could have been such a “therapeutic tool” to prepare the wider public for the reception of further news.

CONCLUSION:

back to the initial question: what is next ?

With a) a growing number and impact of sources and reports of various origin, b) authorities falling behind to provide transparency in the elaboration and communication of fact-based answers, c) a noticeable increase and simultaneous trivialization of the topic in the media, d) a change in leadership in the US, linked to individuals that appear more open to address the matter, I am of the opinion that we a very close to witnessing a public disclosure of historic dimensions.

JAL516 / JA722A crash at RJTT (Haneda) 02.01.2024

after reviewing a number of sources presented at different sites, I would like to add a few more points and present my early analysis of the likely causal events for the accident (isolated on this site, without adding to the speculations winding up elsewhere. let’s wait for the official report from JTSB – and compare).

current facts as presented from official sources:

  1. METAR: RJTT 020900Z 33008KT 9999 FEW020 07/04 Q1016 NOSIG
  2. NOTAM J2253/23: [..] STOP-BAR-LGT FOR C1 THRU C14-U/S [..]
  3. ATC transcript (released by Japanese Ministry of Transportation)
    • JAL516 had received landing clearance RWY 34R, positive readback.
    • JA722A taxi to holding point C5 (34R) for #1 in sequence, positive readback.
    • and additionally:
    • JAL166 to continue approach as #2 in sequence, positive readback
    • JAL179 to taxi to holding point C1 (34R) for #3 in sequence, positive readback

Primary question: Why did JA722A, contrary to its clearance, not hold at C5 but entered 34R ? Secondary questions of course relate to: 1) why did TWR (visually or by automated means) not identify the deviation and initiated corrective actions, 2) why was JAL516 unable to identify the abnormal condition and initiated a go-around in time.

While there is a lot to analyze on the environment and procedures related to the secondary set of questions, at this point in time, I would like to solely focus on the primary question. All assertions are speculative in nature and provided with plausible justification:

  1. official sources state that JA722A was a Japanese Coast Guard flight related to Jan 01 24 earthquake disaster relief. It is highly likely that in its flight plan JA722A was given status as a rescue flight and as such was given priority by coordinating stations, including Tokyo TWR.
  2. Consistent with (1) JA722A was cleared to hold for a (non-standard – but acceptable due to the aircraft’s lower requirement on take-off runway available) intersection (C5) take-off on RWY 34R. Tower assigned JA722A as #1 in sequence for runway 34R, relative to #2 JAL166 on approach, behind JAL516 (which has just been given already clearance to land) and to #3 JAL179 on ground for departure, cleared to taxi to (standard) holding point C1, about 30 seconds after JA722A had receive its assignment to C5. Therefore, TWR had indeed prepared a priority sequencing for JA722A, putting it ahead of competing JAL179 (which it would likely have followed to C1) and scheduling it’s departure between landing JAL516 and approaching JAL166. The effective sequence at this point in time was:
    • #0 JAL516: on final, cleared to land 34R
    • #1 JA722A: on ground, to hold at C5, 34R
    • #2 JAL155: on approach, to continue approach 34R
    • #3 JAL179: on ground, to hold at C1, 34R
  3. TWR in it’s communicated sequencing (starting at #1) did not further mention aircraft #0. In fact JA722A and JAL516 obviously being on the same frequency, situational awareness of the JA722A crew would have allowed them to pick up JAL516’s landing clearance right before receiving their clearance to hold at C5. Only in the case that TWR would have considered issuing a conditional “line up and wait” clearance to JA722A (such as: “JA722A line up RWY 34R and wait BEHIND landing aircraft on final BEHIND”) TWR would have mentioned the landing traffic.
  4. On CCTV footage from the airport camera (www.youtube.com/watch?v=6NbVdIoJsHY&t=169, Note: Please enlarge the video to full screen and monitor the faint white dot moving just above the upper edge of the tail of the distant ANA aircraft that just started taxiing from the illuminated area of the apron towards the darker runway area), at video time 3:00 one can see JA722A to enter 34R and wait in a position aligning with the runway as its landing light turns (left) towards the camera and distinctly grows brighter. From this moment on, JA722A is holding position on RWY 34R for an eternity of 48 (!) seconds – apparently waiting for a take-off clearance – before being impacted by the landing JAL516. On the video one can occasionally distinguish the JA722A strobe lights first moving and then holding with the aircraft, but its red flashing beacon is not visible on the recording.
  5. The captain of JA722A was reported to be the sole survivor of this aircraft and (unconfirmed) Japanese Coast Guard sources quote him as being conscious of having received a clearance to (at least) enter RWY 34R. If the captain (LH seat) was pilot flying (PF) and RH seat was pilot monitoring (PM), there is obviously a “connection” between the captain’s statement and the apparent action of the aircraft, but a huge “disconnect” with the ATC clearance (to hold at C5) which was properly read back from the aircraft. In essence, this appears to be a catastrophic disconnect between the mental models of PF and PM. In addition, there are possible physical factors contributing to the fatal actions taken by the crew:
    • (1) If PM was distracted by monitoring ATC (in English language), preparing the aircraft (working the checklists) for priority departure as #1 in sequence, PM (in his RH seat, not being the captain) was likely the only one two have an unobstructed view before line-up towards the arrival end of RWY 34R to spot (in very good visual conditions, see METAR at source 1 above) landing- & strobe-lights of JAL516. PF was likely not in this visual position, and likely not advised by PM, as this would be the case in a cockpit with well established CRM.
    • (2) As stated in source 2, NOTAM indicates that runway stop lights at C5 (and other intersections) were un-serviceable. With regard to the validity of the NOTAM however, additional caution has to be exercised since further provisions in the AIP Japan and possible trigger NOTAMs may be required. If stop-bar lights were indeed not operational, the crew (and specifically PF) would lack an additional clue that the mental model of having received a clearance for line-up was invalid.
  6. Possible causative mental factors, such as disorientation and stress within the cockpit of JA722A could be:
    • (1) night operations at a major international airport, ATC in English language, a non-commercial (coast guard) crew.
    • (2) a sense of urgency and stress perceived by a likely “rescue mission” flight status and an effective priority handling, being assigned #1 in sequence for RWY 34R.
  7. Adding to (6) but being HIGHLY SPECULATIVE in nature, I listened to ATC recordings from Tokyo TWR (remark: I have for myself ICAO English Level 6 printed in my license, but I have to admit that Haneda TWR communications in English by non-native Japanese speakers are EXTREMELY DIFFICULT to follow) on an (amateur) source www.youtube.com/watch?v=LP1xWcyKBDs&t=912s. In fact, those Internet resources usually pool together reception of several TWR frequencies – serving different parts of the airport – in a single audio stream). At the entry point marked (15:13) the recording starts with the C5 holding clearance given to JA722A (note: the documented readback from the aircraft however has not been picked-up on this specific recording – possibly due to low radio signal strength). However, at 15:24, immediately afterwards, one can hear a clearance given to another aircraft on runway 05 to “line up and wait runway zero five”. In a state of mental stress, let’s assume the following:
    • (1) JA722A had initially prepared a radio setup for several possible TWR frequencies, having the one pertaining to RWY 34R selected “active” and another frequency (for RWY 05) selected “stand-by”, possibly monitoring. Depending on the radio equipment of the aircraft, it is possible to simultaneously monitor (listen only) the stand-by frequency while being able to listen & speak on the active one. If this was intentionally or accidentally selected by the crew, then
    • (2) If the mental model of PF was anticipating an expedite #1 departure out of “charlie five” by a soon to follow order to line up, the audible reception of “runway zero five, line up and wait” could be “joined” into the PF’s mental model via the word “five” and his expectation on clearance to enter the runway. The consequence would match exactly the fatal actions taken by the aircraft: line up and wait.
  8. One could speculate that crew communication on board Japanese Coast Guard’s JA722A was obeying to a more military “chain of command” and challenging a decision of a senior party (here: PF, captain) by a junior party (here: PM) is not a strong point in Asia, as this might further be a matter in Japanese culture. This being said, there was perhaps too little room for questioning and corrective action inside the cockpit – sadly within an extensively long waiting time right in the middle of an active runway.

Abbreviations: METAR (meteorological aerodrome report), NOTAM (notice to airmen), AIP (aeronautical information publication), RWY (runway), CRM (crew resource management), ATC (air traffic control), TWR (tower), RH (right hand), LH (left hand)